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constitutional authority to do so?
Because the validity of the search warrant was unquestioned
at trial, the trial court did not rule on MIL. issue.
Consequently, this Court may resolve it as a matter of law,

1

without reference to any standard of review.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
References to constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules
are unnecessary to the disposition of this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony, arising from a late-night armed
robbery of a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant.

The trial court

sentenced him to five years to life in prison, to run
consecutively with another sentence he was already serving.
Defendant appealed the conviction on five grounds, all of which
this Court rejected in an unpublished memorandum decision.

State

v. Thomas, No. 960170-CA (Utah App. Nov. 29, 1996)(unpublished).
On certiorari, however, the Utah Supreme Court reversed this
Court's determination that the issuance of a search warrant was
not controlled by Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah
1994)(prohibiting court commissioners from performing core
judicial functions).

See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah

1998) at addendum A.

Because the Supreme Court held that issuing

a search warrant is a core judicial function involving ultimate
judicial power, it invalidated the warrant and remanded the case
"for a determination as to whether the trial court's failure to
suppress evidence obtained from the search constituted reversible
error."

Id. at 305.

On the State's motion, this Court ordered

2

the question briefed.

See Order at addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The following facts are relevant to the sole issue before
the Court.

After a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant was robbed

at gunpoint late one night, the responding police officers began
searching an adjacent apartment complex.

A woman approached one

of the officers and asked if she was looking for a robber.

When

the officer confirmed that she was, the woman said, "He's in
apartment #82," and described an individual who had been staying
next door to her apartment for a few days (R. 360, 824-25, 83435) .
Several uniformed officers met at apartment #82 (R. 815) .
Looking through windows located on each side of the front door,
they saw an individual in the lighted interior who matched the
descriptions provided both by dispatch and by the next door
neighbor (R. 816, 834) . One officer knocked loudly on the door
with a flashlight (R. 816). Although the police announced
themselves and the man inside knew they were there, he refused to
answer the door or speak to them (R. 360 or addendum A, R. 817).
At this juncture, the police forced entry into the
apartment.
in here.

As they did so, they heard someone say, "Don't come
I have a hostage and I'll kill her" (R. 360 or addendum
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A).

The officers immediately retreated.1
Several officers maintained constant surveillance on the

apartment throughout the night while two officers prepared a
search warrant, took it to a court commissioner's home for her
review and signature, and then returned to apartment #82 (R. 360,
420, 840, 859, 871, 911). Just before 6 a.m., defendant emerged
from the apartment and was taken into custody (R. 420, 841). The
officers then executed the search warrant and discovered
incriminating evidence in the apartment (R. 360, 420, 841-42,
859) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because the Supreme Court held that the issuance of the
search warrant by the court commissioner was unconstitutional,
the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant can only be admitted
if an exception exists that would justify admittance of the
evidence without a warrant.

In this case, because the officers

acted pursuant to the good faith exception to the warrant
requirement, the evidence obtained in the search of the apartment
should not be suppressed.

1

Defendant filed a motion in limine to prevent the state
from introducing evidence about the hostage situation, arguing
that its probative value with regard to the aggravated robbery
was outweighed by its potentially prejudicial effect (R. 516-22).
Although the court denied the motion, the State chose not to
elicit testimony about the hostage situation at trial (R. 557).
When the officers finally searched the apartment pursuant to the
search warrant, they found no hostage inside (R. 420).
4

ARGUMENT
ALTHOUGH THE SUPREME COURT HELD
THAT COURT COMMISSIONERS CANNOT
CONSTITUTIONALLY ISSUE SEARCH
WARRANTS, THE EVIDENCE SEIZED
PURSUANT TO AN OTHERWISE VALID
WARRANT ISSUED PRIOR TO THE COURT'S
DECISION SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED
BECAUSE THE POLICE ACTED IN GOOD
FAITH AND SUPPRESSION OF THE
EVIDENCE WOULD SERVE NO DETERRENT
PURPOSE
The sole question presented by this case is whether evidence
seized pursuant to an otherwise valid search warrant should be
suppressed where a reviewing court later determines that the
issuing magistrate lacked the constitutional authority to issue
the warrant.

Under such circumstances, in order to sustain the

search, the State must identify a valid basis other than the
warrant on which to justify the search.

See, e.g. State v. Gray,

717 p.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986)(reviewing court may affirm on any
alternative ground).

In this case,

the good faith exception to

the warrant requirement justifies the search and renders all
evidence seized pursuant to it admissible.
The law is well-settled that federal constitutional
guarantees against unlawful search and seizure require exclusion
of illegally obtained evidence in state criminal trials.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

Mapp v.

Thus, if a search warrant - for which

the law expresses a general preference -

has not been obtained

or is defective, some exception to the warrant requirement is

5

required to justify admittance of the evidence.

In a case

subsequent to Mapp v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court
carved out an exception to the general warrant requirement,
holding that evidence obtained by police officers who act in good
faith, reasonably and objectively relying on a search warrant
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, may be admitted even
if the warrant is ultimately found to be unsupported by probable
cause.

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).

"It is

only when the officer's reliance is ^wholly unwarranted' that
good faith is absent."

State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 711 (Utah

App. 1993)(citations omitted).
The good faith exception to the warrant requirement first
articulated in Leon was subsequently extended in Illinois v.
Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).

In Krull, the Court held that an

exception to the exclusionary rule, similar to that articulated
in Leon, "should be recognized when officers act in objectively
reasonable reliance upon a statute

. . . where the statute is

ultimately found to violate the Fourth amendment."

Krull, 480

U.S. at 342.
In both of these cases, the highest court of our nation
upheld searches based on a police officer's objectively
reasonable reliance on either a defective warrant or a defective
statute.

The rationale of these decisions is rooted in the

primary purpose of the exclusionary rule: "to deter future
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unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of
the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures."
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).

Because the

circumstances presented by Leon and Krull did not implicate the
future conduct of police officers, the Supreme Court determined
that the exclusionary rule was not an appropriate remedy.
The rationale of both Leon and Krull applies to the instant
case.

Here, the police reasonably relied on a search warrant

issued pursuant to statute by a court commissioner acting as a
magistrate.

Ultimately, however, the Utah Supreme Court held

that the commissioner's exercise of such authority under the
statute was unconstitutional.

In determining whether to apply

the exclusionary rule to the evidence obtained pursuant to this
defective warrant, this Court should examine whether applying the
rule will advance its purpose of deterring police misconduct.
See Krull, 480 U.S. at 353.
Notably, in this case, no police misconduct was ever
alleged.

Indeed, the undisputed facts reflect that the police

sought and secured a valid search warrant through all appropriate
channels.

Only later, on appeal, did the Utah Supreme Court

determine that issuance of a search warrant was a "core judicial
function'' and thus beyond the ambit of a court commissioner's
authority.

See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 302-04.

Under such

circumstances, then, suppression of the evidence would be wholly
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unrelated to the conduct of the police and would serve no
deterrent purpose at all.
Not only is this case wholly lacking in police misconduct,
but it is also marked by affirmative evidence of good faith.
While the police initially made a brief warrantless entry into
the apartment, they retreated quickly and put the apartment under
surveillance.

They then prepared a search warrant, took it to a

court commissioner's home for authorization in the middle of the
night, and returned to the apartment.

After defendant emerged

voluntarily from the apartment the next morning, the police
executed the warrant.

Thomas, 961 P.2d at 300.

The facts thus

demonstrate that the police, wholly cognizant of their
responsibility to secure a well-founded warrant before searching
the apartment, did all they reasonably could to ensure that the
subsequent search of the apartment was lawful.
Because the police acted in good faith and because
suppression of the evidence would serve no deterrent purpose, the
good faith exception to the warrant requirement provides an
alternative ground for admitting the evidence found in the search
of the apartment.

Consequently, the trial court's failure to

suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the defective warrant
did not constitute reversible error.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm the trial

8

court's admission of the evidence seized in the apartment and
affirm his conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995).
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2$L d a y

of

December, 1998.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Richard Dee THOMAS, Defendant
and Petitioner.
No. 970049.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 22, 1998.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, William B.
Bohling, J., of aggravated robbery. The
Court of Appeals affirmed and certiorari was
granted. The Supreme Court, Russon, J.,
held that: (1) court commissioner could not
constitutionally issue search warrant given
that issuing search warrant was core judicial
function involving ultimate judicial power,
and (2) defendant inadequately briefed photo
array issue.
Reversed in part, affirmed in part and
remanded.
1. Certiorari e=>63.1
On certiorari, Supreme Court reviews
decision of Court of Appeals, not decision of
trial court.
2. Certiorari <3=>64(1)
On certiorari, Supreme Court reviews
Court of Appeals' decision for correctness
and gives its conclusions of law no deference.
3. Officers and Public Employees <3=*43
Under doctrine of "de facto authority/'
actions performed by those without actual
authority are validated when they are performed by one who, under the color of law,
assumes to exercise official authority, is reputed to have it, and the community acquiesces accordingly.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

4. Court Commissioners <3>3
Courts <2>100(1)
Instant decision, holding that court commissioner does not have authority to issue

search warrant, is prospective, and any prior
search warrant issued by commissioner is
mlid under de facto doctrine, except that
present defendant would be given benefit of
his victory, in making his constitutional challenge. Const. Art. 8, § 1; U.C.A.1953, 78-331, 78-3-31(6)(a).
5. Court Commissioners c=>3
Holding in Ohms prohibiting court commissioners from performing core judicial
functions did not deconstitutionalize court
commissioners given that court commissioners are still able to perform many important
functions in assistance to courts such as conducting fact finding hearings, holding pretrial
conferences, and making other recommendations to judges. Const. Art. 8, § 1; U.C.A.
1953, 78-3-31.
6. Court Commissioners <S=>3
Issuance of search warrant is core judicial function, which court commissioners lack
authority to perform, though statute purports to give such authority to magistrates,
which term includes commissioners, given
that issuing search warrant could not be
characterized as permissible functions of
commissioner of either recommendation to
judge or other action reviewable by judge,
arid, when judge issues law enforcement ordsr to search and seize, judge simultaneously
exercises power and authority to enforce
such order, and once armed with issued warrant, law enforcement proceeds to search and
ssize at will. Const. Art. 8, § 1; U.CA1953,
77-1-3, 77-23-201, 78^3-31, 78-3-31(6)(a).
7. Court Commissioners <£=>3
Core judicial functions can 6e performed
oiily by duly appointed judges, and not by
court commissioners, and thus, only duly appointed judges can issue search warrants.
Const Art. 8, § 1.
8. Criminal Law <3=>1130(5)
Due to defendant's lack of analysis, issue
of whether trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress a positive eyewitness
identification made from suspect photo array
was inadequately briefed, and thus, Court of
Appeals was justified in declining to address
it. Rules App.Proc, Rule 24(a)(9).
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9. Criminal Law <3=»1130(5)
Reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed.
Rules App.Proc, Rule 24(a)(9).
10, Criminal Law <5=>1130(5)
While failure to cite to pertinent authority may not always render an issue inadequately briefed, it does so when the overall
analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift
the burden of research and argument to the
reviewing court. Rules App.Proc, Rule
24(a)(9).
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Joanne C. Slotnik,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Bel-Ami Demontreux, Salt Lake City, for
Defendant and Petitioner.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
RUSSON, Justice:
We granted certiorari to review the Utah
Court of Appeals' decision that our holding in
Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah
1994) (prohibiting court commissioners from
performing core judicial functions), does not
apply to the issuance of a search warrant by
a court commissioner. We are also asked to
review the court of appeals' refusal to address defendant's claim that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress a
positive eyewitness identification made from
a suspect photo array. The court of appeals*
refusal was based upon inadequate briefing.
State v. Thomas, No. 960170-CA, slip op.
(Ct-App. November 29, 1996} (memorandum
decision), cert, granted, 937 P.2d 136 (Utah
1997). We reverse as to the applicability of
Ohms and affirm as to the refusal to address
the photo array issue.
FACTS
On the night of June 30, 1993, an armed
robbery was committed at a fast food restaurant in Salt Lake County, Utah. At gun
point, the assailant ordered the manager to
put all the money into a bag and to accompany him to the parking lot. The manager was
1.

It later turned out that there was no hostage.

then released, and the assailant ran away.
Shortly thereafter, police officers arrived on
the scene and began their investigation of the
robbery. As part of their investigation, they
received a lead on a suspect who was reported to be in a nearby apartment. The suspect
was defendant Richard Dee Thomas. When
the police arrived at the apartment, a confrontation ensued with Thomas. The officers
forced entry into the apartment but retreated after Thomas threatened to kill a hostage.1 Then, while some officers guarded the
apartment, others went to obtain a search
warrant.
During the early morning of July 1, 1993,
Third District Court Commissioner Frances
M. Palacios issued a search warrant. After
obtaining the search warrant, the police officers returned to the scene. Shortly thereafter, Thomas surrendered, and the apartment
was searched. During the search, the police
seized evidence linking Thomas to the crime.
On July 2, 1993, the manager of the restaurant was shown a photo array of six men and
identified Thomas as the man who committed
the robbery. During interrogation and after
Thomas waived his Miranda rights, Thomas
confessed to committing the armed robbery.
On July (), 1993, the State filed an information against Thomas, charging him with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 7G-G-302.
Thomas pleaded not guilty.
Prior to trial, Thomas moved to suppress
evidence obtained during the search. Thomas cited Salt Lake City v. Ohms and argued
that the issuance of a search warrant constitutes a fundamental court function and thus
the search and seizure were unconstitutional
in that the court commissioner who issued
the search warrant lacked the authority to do
so. This motion was denied. Thomas also
moved to suppress eyewitness identification,
arguing, inter alia, that the photo array of
the six men was unduly suggestive. This
motion wras also denied. On August 4, 1995,
a jury convicted Thomas as charged.
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals,
Thomas asserted, inter alia, that the trial
court erred when it denied Thomas's motion
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to suppress evidence and his motion to sup- Ohms had prospective application and therepress eyewitness identification. In an un- fore was inapplicable to Thomas's case bepublished memorandum decision, the court ofcause the search warrant pre-dated our mlappeals affirmed the trial court's rulings. ing in Ohms; (2) Thomas's assertion that
Thomas then petitioned this court for certio- court commissioners have no power was too
rari review, and we granted the petition. broad a reading of Ohms since only the
exercise of core judicial functions by court
ANALYSIS
commissions was prohibited; and (3) Ohms
[1,2] "On certiorari, we review the deci- did not apply because the issuance of a
sion of the court of appeals, not the decision search warrant is not a core judicial function.
of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 910 We address these holdings in turn.
P.2d 1196,1199 (Utah 1995). "We review the
court of appeals' decision for correctness and
[3] In Ohms, Ohms had been charged
give its conclusions of law no deference." with giving false or misleading information to
Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d a police officer, a class C misdemeanor, in
346, 350 (Utah 1997).
violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance
§ 11.04.100. Ohms was tried, convicted, and
I
sentenced by a court commissioner pursuant
2
The first issue we address is whether the to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-31(6)(a) (1992).
court of appeals erred when it held that Salt Ohms appealed to this court, arguing that a
Lake City u. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994), court commissioner did not have the authoridid not apply to the issuance of a search ty to enter afinaljudgment of conviction and
warrant. Before the court of appeals, Thom- impose sentence, as such was an unconstituas argued that court commissioners do not tional exercise of ultimate judicial power.
have the authority to issue search warrants. We agreed and held that court commissionIn a rather scant summary disposition of the ers cannot exercise a judge's ultimate judicial
issue, the court of appeals disagreed, simply power or, in other words, cannot perform
stating:
core judicial functions. In so holding, we
Thomas relies on Salt Lake City v. Ohms found significant the fact that "[c]ourt comfor the proposition that "the Utah Su- missioners are employees of the judiciary,
preme Court, on August 18, 1994, held that not duly appointed judges," and that commisUtah Code Annotated § 78-3-31 (1992\ sioners are not subject to the "constitutional
that gave to Utah court commissioners checks and balances" to which duly appointed
their powers was unconstitutional." In ad^ judges are subject. Ohms, 881 P.2d at 851.
dition to having prospective application, We thus found section 78-3-31(6)(a) unconThomas's reading of Ohms is too broad stitutional because it delegated the core judiand does not apply to the issuance of a cial functions of entering final judgment and
search warrant.
imposing sentence to a court commissioner.
Under the doctrine of de facto authority,3 we
Thomas, slip op. at 1 (citation omitted).
Although the court of appeals should have validated the past actions of court commiselaborated to make its ruling more clear, the sioners who had engaged in the unconstituessence of its holding appears to be that (1) tional exercise of core judicial functions.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-3 l(6)(a) (1992) stated;
The court commissioner may accept pleas of
guilty or no contest, impose sentence, and en^
ter final judgment in misdemeanor cases,
Upon the informed consent of the defendant*
the court commissioner may conduct a jury or
nonjury misdemeanor trial in accordance with
the law. Upon conviction, the commissioner
may impose sentence and enter final judgment.
The judgment entered by the commissioner

shall be the final judgment of the court for all
purposes, including appeal.
3.

Under this doctrine, actions performed by
those without actual authority are validated
when they are performed by one who, under the
color of law. " 'assumes to exercise official authority, is reputed to have it, and the community
acquiesces accordingly.'" Ohms, 881 P.2d at
854 (quoting Husse\ v. Smith, 99 U.S. 20, 24, 25
L.Ed. 314(1878)). '
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Prospective Application

[4] Given only the court of appeals' conclusive statement, we assume that it agreed
with the State's argument that Thomas was
precluded from challenging commissioner actions because we limited Ohms to prospective
application and the search warrant was issued some fourteen months prior to Ohms.
Indeed, a review of the record reveals that
the search warrant was issued on July 1,
1993, over thirteen months prior to the Ohms
decision. However, while we stated in Ohms
that "actions taken by commissioners in the
past are not subject to challenge since court
commissioners in those cases acted with de
facto authority," we declined to apply the de
facto doctrine to Ohms as he had "sustained
the burden of attacking an unconstitutional
statute." To hold otherwise and deprive an
appellant of "the fruits of victory" would have
the effect of "discouraging challenges to statutes of questionable validity." Ohms, 881
P.2d at 854-55. In the case before us, by
arguing that the issuance of a search warrant
is a core judicial function, Thomas, like
Ohms, is attacking the constitutionality of a
court commissioner's exercise of power.
Thus, if Thomas sustains this burden, and we
hold that he does, then the de facto doctrine
would not apply to him for the same reasons
it did not apply to Ohms. As in Ohms, our
decision today is prospective, and any search
warrants issued by court commissioners in
the past are valid, as they were issued with
de facto authority. Id
B.

The Power of Court Commissioners

[5] Thomas argued before the court of
appeals that our decision in Ohms held section 78-3-31 unconstitutional and thus "deinstitutionalized
court
commissioners."
The court of appeals dismissed this argument
as going beyond what was actually held in
Ohms. The court of appeals is correct. In
Ohms, we clearly stated that section 78-3-31
violated the Utah Constitution "to the extent
that it purports to vest ultimate judicial power of courts of record in persons who have
not been duly appointed as article VIII
judges." Id at 855 (emphasis added). We
also acknowledged that court commissioners
"may perform many important functions in

assistance to courts" such as conducting fact
finding hearings, holding pretrial conferences, and making other recommendations to
judges. In fact, we specifically stated that
"our decision in no way affects the authority
and functions that court commissioners have
enjoyed for over thirty years and will undoubtedly continue to enjoy in the future."
Id at 851-52 n. 17. Nowhere in Ohms did we
"deinstitutionalize" the court commissioner
system.
C. Issuance of a Search Warrant
as a Core Judicial Function
The court of appeals also held that Ohms
did not apply because the issuance of a
search warrant is not a core judicial function.
This is a question of first impression.
In Ohms, we stated that core judicial functions include (1) "'the power to hear and
determine controversies between adverse
parties and questions in litigation/ " (2) " 'the
authority to hear and determine justiciable
controversies,'" (3) " 'the authority to enforce
any valid judgment, decree or order,'" and
(4) "all powers that are 'necessary to protect
the fundamental integrity of the judicial
branch/ " Id at 849 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Core judicial functions do not
include functions that are generally designed
to "assist" courts, such as conducting fact
finding hearings, holding pretrial conferences, and making recommendations to
judges. In these instances, the commissioners' actions are reviewable by a judge; thus,
ultimate judicial power remains with the
judge. Id at 851 n. 17.
[6] Turning to the present case, it is well
established that a search warrant is an order.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-201 (1995) (defining search warrant as "an order issued by
a magistrate in the name of the state and
directed to a peace officer," describing the
search and property to be seized); 1933 Revised Statutes of Utah § 105-54-1 (stating
that "[a] search warrant is an order in writing, in the name of the state, signed by a
magistrate and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the magistrate"),
quoted in Allen v. Holbrook 103 Utah 319,
135 P.2d 242, 247-48 (1943); see also 79
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C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 128 (1995).
When a judge issues to law enforcement an
order to search and seize, the judge simultaneously exercises the power and authority to
enforce such an order, because once armed
with an issued warrant, law enforcement proceeds to search and seize at will. Thus,
because a search warrant is an order and the
issuer possesses the authority to enforce the
order, the issuance of a search warrant is a
core judicial function, which commissioners
lack the authority to perform.
This holding is buttressed by the fact that
the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures embodied in the Utah
and United States Constitutions4 is one of
the most fundamental and cherished rights
we possess. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 753, 758, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662
(1985) ("The Fourth Amendment protects
. . . the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men/ " (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct.
564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))); Camara v. Municipal Ct, 387
U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930
(1967) ("The Fourth Amendment thus gives
concrete expression to a right of the people
which is 'basic to a free society.'" (quoting
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct.
1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949))); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91
L.Ed. 1399 (1947) ("This Court has consistently asserted that the rights of privacy and
personal security protected by the Fourth
Amendment *... are to be regarded as of the
very essence of constitutional liberty; and
that the guaranty of them is as important
and as imperative as are the guaranties of
the other fundamental rights of the individual citizen
'" (quoting Gouled v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 304, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65
L.Ed. 647 (1921))), overruled in part by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct.
2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Given the magnitude of the right at risk when a search
4. The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which is practically identical to article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, states:
The nght of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not

warrant is issued, we have no difficulty in
granting the issuance of a search warrant
core function status.
[7] The State proffers two arguments as
to why court commissioners have the authority to issue search warrants. First, the State
claims that commissioner authority to issue
search warrants stems from their status as
magistrates, who possess the clear statutory
grant of power to issue search warrants.
Section 77-1-3 does define a magistrate as "a
justice or judge of a court of record or not of
record or a commissioner of such a court
appointed in accordance with Section 78-331," and section 78-7-17.5(l)(c) does vest authority in magistrates to "issue ... warrants
of search." However, as we have outlined
above, Ohms held that under the Utah Constitution core judicial functions can be performed only by duly appointed judges.
Thus, in accordance with our holding today,
only duly appointed judges can issue search
warrants. Court commissioners are not
judges, and thus they cannot issue search
warrants. Any attempt by the legislature to
statutorily confer the power to issue search
warrants upon court commissioners would be
null and void as a violation of the Utah
Constitution. We do not hold the abovestated statutes unconstitutional, however, because section 78-7-17.5(1) clearly grants
magistrates the power to issue search warrants, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
law."
Second, the State argues that the issuance
of a search warrant is not a core judicial
function involving the exercise of ultimate
judicial power but rather involves a nonadjudicative preliminary matter that simply assists the court in moving the case along.
Certainly, many actions are capable of "assisting" courts, including the performance of
core judicial functions. Thus, determining
whether a particular action assists a court
does not end the inquiry. As we have noted,
functions that commissioners can constitube violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
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tionally perform are those that constitute
recommendations or other functions that are
reviewable by a judge. Issuing a search
warrant cannot be characterized as either a
recommendation or an action that is reviewable by a judge. The commissioner in this
case did not recommend to the judge that the
warrant be issued but rather issued it herself. Similarly, the decision to issue was not
subject to review by a judge with the possibility of disallowing the search. Rather, the
order to search and seize was issued and
then executed immediately thereafter. Furthermore, while the issuance of a search
warrant is a "preliminary" decision when
looking at a criminal prosecution as a whole,
it is a final decision as to whether a search
will occur. Thus, while issuing a search warrant does not rise to the level of finality as
entering judgment and imposing sentence, as
was disallowed in Ohms, it is sufficiently final
to establish it as a core judicial function. We
thus hold that because the issuance of a
search warrant is a core judicial function,
which cannot be performed by a court commissioner, the court of appeals erred when it
held that Ohms did not apply.
Thomas also objects to a court commissioner presiding over his first appearance. He
argues that, similar to issuing a search warrant, presiding over a first appearance is a
core judicial function that commissioners lack
the authority to perform. However, Thomas
fails in his brief to identify or describe this
hearing or discuss what the commissioner's
actions were and how these actions constituted the exercise of core judicial functions.
Thomas cited only to the Third Circuit
Court's docket sheet stating that a first appearance took place. A review of the record
reveals no further evidence of the first appearance. It does show, however, that
Thomas's preliminary hearing was held before Circuit Court Judge Phillip K. Palmer
and that it was he who bound Thomas over
for trial in Third District Court. Rule
24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an appellant's argument to
contain the "reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the . . . parts of the record relied
on." Thomas has failed to comply with these
requirements. His brief is totally inade-

quate, and therefore, we decline to address
this issue.
II
[8] The second issue we address is
whether the court of appeals erred when it
declined to address Thomas's claim that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress a positive eyewitness identification
made from a suspect photo array because
Thomas failed to adequately brief the issue.
The court of appeals stated:
Thomas ignores several decisions addressing proper challenges to photo array cases.
See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1111
(Utah 1994); State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d
432, 435 (Utah 1989). Because Thomas
fails to adequately brief this argument, it is
without merit and we decline to address it.
See Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring "citations to the authorities [and] statutes . . .
relied on").
Thomas, slip op. at 3.
A review of the record reveals that Thomas devoted four pages of his brief before the
court of appeals to his photo array argument.
However, almost three of these pages consisted of direct quotes from the trial transcript. On the basis of the trial testimony,
Thomas then asserted that the photo array
was overly suggestive. His only reference to
any legal authority is contained in the bald
assertions that the
identification also taints any other identification of Mr. Thomas in violation of due
process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The overly suggestive photo array
also violates Art. I, § 7 of the Utah State
Constitution (Due process); see also State
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).
These statements concluded his argument.
[9] It is well established that a reviewing
court will not address arguments that are
not adequately briefed. State v. Herrera,
895 P.2d 359, 368 n. 5 (Utah 1995) (refusing
to address defendant's state due process argument where argument entailed only superficial statement concerning Utah's unique
history and reference to another part of de-
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fendant's brief); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d
960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining to rule on
issue where defendant's brief "wholly
lack[ed] legal analysis and authority to support his argument"); State v. Amicone, 689
P.2d 1341,1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to rule
on separation of powers argument where argument was not supported by any legal analysis or authority).

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' holding that Salt Lake City v. Ohms
does not apply to the issuance of a search
warrant. Issuing a search warrant is a core
judicial function involving ultimate judicial
power. We remand the case to the court of
appeals for a determination as to whether the
trial court's failure to suppress evidence obtained from the search constituted reversible
error. We further affirm the court of appeals' holding that Thomas inadequately
briefed the photo array issue.

In deciding whether an argument has been
adequately briefed, we look to the standard
set forth in rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. This rule states that
the argument in the appellant's brief "shall
HOWE, C.J., DURHAM, Associate C.J.,
contain the contentions and reasons of the and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, J J.,
appellant with respect to the issues present- concur in Justice RUSSON's opinion.
ed . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on." Im[ O I«YNUM8!*SYSTIM>
plicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald
citation to authority but development of that
authority and reasoned analysis based on
that authority. We have previously stated
that this court is not " 'a depository in which
the appealing party may dump the burden of
argument and research.*" State v. Bishop,
753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. OpsahL, 92 Ill.App.3d 1087, 48
IU.Dec. 510, 511, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981)).
[10] In his brief to the court of appeals,
Thomas did cite to the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution, to article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution, and to the case of State v. Ramirez.
However, this is all he did. Analysis of what
this authority requires and of how the facts
of Thomas's case satisfy these requirements
was wholly lacking. The court of appeals
also noted, "Thomas ignores several decisions
addressing proper challenges to photo array
cases." Thomas, slip op. at 3. While failure
to cite to pertinent authority may not always
render an issue inadequately briefed, it does
so when the overall analysis of the issue is so
lacking as to shift the burden of research and
argument to the reviewing court. Because of
Thomas's lack of analysis, the photo array
issue was inadequately briefed and the court
of appeals was justified in declining to address it.
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Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

State of Utah,

ORDER

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No.

961170-CA

v.
Richard Dee Thomas,
Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before the court upon appellee's request
filed September 29, 1998, that the court establish a briefing
schedule.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that each party shall file a brief, of
not more than twenty-five (25) pages in length, addressing only
the issue of whether the trial court's failure to suppress
evidence obtained from the search of the apartment constituted
reversible error. Appellant's brief shall be served and filed no
later than thirty (30) days from the date of this order, with
appellee's brief served and filed within thirty (30) days after
service of appellant's brief.
Dated this
FOR THE COURT:

9 tLday

of October, 1998

